BBH Limited Duration Fund

Quarterly Fund Update / 2Q 2019

As we write this Quarterly Update, 14 Euro-denominated high yield bond issues are trading at negative yields. This means that investors are actually paying speculative-grade issues for the privilege of holding their money. Consider the effect of this situation on investors in Europe and beyond. We think it is a tidy explanation for recent U.S. fixed income behavior.

At first glance, credit markets and sovereign markets seem to reflect different views of the future – credit has rallied as if economic conditions are improving (e.g. credit risk is diminishing), yet long sovereign bond rates have rallied and the yield curve has inverted, as if a recession is imminent. Perhaps neither observation is accurate. Instead, yield movements may not be about shifting expectations for growth, but rather reflect expectations for global rate cuts, and the unrelenting global hunt for yield.

Overseas investors, starved for yield in their own markets, are determining the tone in U.S. credit and rates. Crowded out by their own central banks and facing negative yields across a large portion of their own fixed income markets, European and Asian investors have recently been piling into the higher rates in the U.S. Wherever they can find a positive hedged-currency yield, they go, driving those yields lower as well. Overseas flows and hedging dynamics are consistent with:

- the rally in long rates,
- the credit swoon in the fourth quarter of 2018,
- the timing and magnitude of the credit rally in the first half of this year,
- a notably over-stretched high yield market,
- the diverging path of asset-backed securities (ABS) spreads, and
- where USD credit spreads have met resistance.

Holders of USD Denominated Credit



Sources: HSBC and BBH Analysis

Global Sovereign Curves



Sources: Bloomberg and BBH Analysis

Performance
As of June 30, 2019

	Total Returns		Average Annual Total Returns				
	3 Mo.*	**YTD***	**1 Yr.**	**3 Yr.**	**5 Yr.**	**10 Yr.**	**Since Inception[3]**
Class I[1]	1.28%	2.77%	3.96%	3.04%	2.05%	2.47%	3.97%
Class N[2]	1.26%	2.83%	3.97%	2.96%	1.90%	2.32%	3.81%
Benchmark	1.47%	2.47%	4.02%	1.29%	1.22%	1.20%	2.77%

Class I Inception: 12/03/2002
Class N Inception: 12/22/2000

Class I: Net/Gross Expense Ratio (%) 0.27/0.27
Class N: Net/Gross Expense Ratio (%) 0.35/0.50

* Returns are not annualized.

Effective March 24, 2017, the Investment Adviser has voluntarily agreed to limit the Annual Fund Operating Expenses of Class N to 0.35%. This is a voluntary waiver that can be changed at any time at the sole discretion of the Investment Adviser.

Past performance does not guarantee future results, and current performance may be lower or higher than the past performance data quoted. The investment return and principal value will fluctuate, and shares, when sold, may be worth more or less than the original cost. For performance current to the most recent month-end please call 1-800-625-5759.

[1] The Class I shares commenced operations on December 3, 2002. Prior to December 3, 2002, performance reflects performance of the Class N shares adjusted to assume that all charges, expenses and fees were deducted. Performance prior to December 22, 2000 is that of the BBH Broad Market Fixed Income Portfolio adjusted to assume that all charges, expenses and fees of the Fund and the Portfolio which are presently in effect were deducted during such periods, as permitted by applicable SEC staff interpretations. [2] The Class N shares commenced operations on December 22, 2000. Performance prior to December 22, 2000 is that of the BBH Broad Market Fixed Income Portfolio adjusted to assume that all charges, expenses and fees of the Fund and the Portfolio which are presently in effect were deducted during such periods, as permitted by applicable SEC staff interpretations. [3] "Inception Date" (7/20/2000) is the inception date of the BBH Broad Market Fixed Income Portfolio.

The Bloomberg Barclays U.S. 1-3 Year Treasury Bond Index is an unmanaged index of fixed rate obligations of the U.S. Treasury with maturities ranging from 1 to 3 years. The index is not available for direct investment.

Sources: BBH & Co. and Bloomberg

Overseas investors now own *half* of all credit denominated in U.S. dollars (hereafter "USD Credit"), and the most active share next to U.S. Mutual Funds, which own around 20%. They also own a bit less than half of the entire U.S. taxable fixed income market. It is reasonable to conclude that flows from overseas investors are the most important factor determining credit pricing in our markets today.

A growing portion of debt trades at negative yields

Since 2015, both Japanese and Eurozone yields have been less than 1%, with negative short rates. In April, even 10-year German and Japanese sovereign bond yields (along with the Netherlands and Sweden) went below zero for the second time (the first being in 2016). Today, a total of nearly $14 trillion of sovereign debt trades at negative yields. The few remaining pockets of positive yields are not very impressive. Formerly high yielding European sovereigns, such as Spain and Portugal, now offer 10-year debt at just 0.2% and 0.4%, respectively, while the (abundant) Italian 10-year sovereign yields 1.6% and Greece yields just over 2%.



Data reported daily from July 6, 2018 to July 5, 2019
Sources: Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index and BBH Analysis

Corporate credits have followed suit, and now 20% of investment grade corporate debt in the Eurozone (over $600 billion globally) is trading at negative yields, as well as the collection of junk bonds mentioned above. The lack of decent yield opportunities in their own markets had nudged non-U.S. investors into the U.S. bond markets over the past four years. Negative yields in long sovereign and corporate debt have turned that nudge into a hard shove.

Hedging dynamics and the flat U.S. yield curve

If a non-USD investor buys a hedge of the same maturity as a bond, the hedge will cost the exact difference between home and target sovereign yields because of an equilibrium condition known as "covered interest parity"[1]. So in order to earn a positive spread in sovereigns, Euro or Yen-based investors must hedge *long* USD purchases (let's say 10 years) back into their home currency using a hedge duration of a year or less. This works well when the USD yield curve is steep and spreads are high, as the investor will earn the yield curve slope between the short Treasury rate and 10-year Treasury rates in addition to any credit spread. Decreasing spreads and flattening yield curves – which is exactly what we've had for the last six months – both subtract yield from hedged cross-currency investing.



Data reported monthly from October 31, 2012 to June 30, 2019 and quarterly from December 31, 2012 to June 30, 2019
Sources: Bloomberg and BBH Analysis

There's one further wrinkle. Changes in short rates can play a role in the profitability of an active hedge. If U.S. short rates go up during the hedge period, the overseas investor will take a mark-to-market loss on the hedge and face higher hedging costs going forward. If they are unhedged, they may see a currency gain. If U.S. short rates go down, the investor can reset and earn a gain on their previous hedge. As you can imagine, this makes hedging quite sensitive to Fed policy.

Finally, as hedging gets more and more expensive, overseas investors may choose not to hedge, although this can make them more likely to sell U.S. dollar investments when they perceive increasing currency risk. The U.S. dollar has been range-bound since early 2018, emboldening investors to try to capture the entire U.S. yield advantage in unhedged investments. The Euro has been weakening slowly but steadily vs. the dollar since early 2018, accruing gains to unhedged, Euro-based investors.

Looking at the course of global yields since the European Central Bank (ECB) adopted its "by any means necessary" policy, we have seen the trail of the global hunt for yield fan out across the globe, driving sovereign yields, then investment grade (IG) spreads, and then high yield, tighter.

In the fourth quarter of 2018, we saw the effects of anticipated changes in short rates. Expecting a rate hike, hedged investors began to withdraw from USD credit markets, causing spreads to widen, while Treasuries anticipated a change in Fed stance. When the Fed Chair indicated a willingness to halt rate increases, the Treasury rally continued, but hedged USD credit became more attractive, leading to the huge credit rally in the first half of 2019.

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YKHu3_cNU5E

ABS spreads have been more stable, outperforming in the fourth quarter's down market, but underperforming in the rally this year. The average spreads of several ABS sectors even widened a bit (5-10 basis points[2]) in the second quarter. We've seen the reason for this in our own marketing activity: Japanese investors generally maintain an aversion to ABS, associating them with the 2008 Crisis-Era problems in residential mortgage-backed securities (MBS). European regulators, with similar reasoning, are overtly hostile to securitized investments, passing new eligibility restrictions for Europe so strict that U.S. issuers have mostly chosen to ignore them. We think these foreign investors and regulators unwisely paint ABS with an overly broad brush. Nonetheless, lack of overseas participation is one reason ABS yields seem to march to a different drummer than the rest of the USD credit market.

So what now?

It is implicit in our process that low spreads are correlated with higher risk in credit. When spreads are low, we buy less credit, and prefer shorter credit. We have ample historical evidence that spreads are mean-reverting over a few years. Therefore, buying long credit instruments at narrow spreads often leads to underperformance vs. Treasuries over the following 2-3 years. In fact, history suggests that the longer the period of very low spreads, the sharper the eventual spread-widening has been. We would also observe that long periods of narrow spreads encourage lax credit underwriting and strange investor behavior (such as buying junk bonds at a negative yield, perhaps). The ensuing spread widening is typically catalyzed by a series of unexpected losses arising from this excess. We are in strong agreement that today's investment environment is producing excessive leverage and credit availability, although it takes a different shape (and may pose less systemic risk) than prior cycles.

Will this time be different?

Some observers are suggesting that such unprecedented negative yields may lead to unprecedented market behavior, also known as "this time is different". Not that we won't see increased defaults, but the enormous quantities of money seeking positive hedged yields can stomach moderate losses in investment grade credit, and will perhaps only flee the high yield and direct lending markets. Therefore, the argument goes, investment grade credit is likely to *outperform* despite today's meager spreads. Investors will have to buy investment grade bonds.

It's a fair question: Where will all the foreign money go? Will it go into Treasuries and drive yields even lower, or can it remain in IG credit? We think the fourth quarter of 2018 was revealing (see chart on the right). Just as in prior cycles, all grades of credit underperformed, in proportion to their credit risk.

"This time is different" is a brave, possibly foolish, bet against the historical odds. We can easily imagine investors, as they have before, buying Treasuries instead and letting all classes of credit languish. We will stick with the shorter and less cyclical credit profile until we are compensated to do otherwise. This is not a subjective choice, but is hard wired into our investment process. We will only expose the Fund to credit opportunities when we are appropriately compensated to do so. In this environment, we are still finding enough "off the run" value opportunities to maintain decent performance. Without appropriate compensation, however, we are not interested in adding credit risk.

Fund in the second quarter

The sell-off in December served up enough value opportunities to increase our credit exposure in the Fund. As overseas investors returned in January, however, the corporate market rapidly retraced its steps and today only 8% of the IG universe trades at levels consistent with our buy criteria[3], down from 27% in December and 10% at the

Q4 2018 Credit Market Excess Returns



Past performance is no guarantee of future results
Data reported quarter-to-date as of December 31, 2018
HY = High Yield, MBS = Mortgage-Backed Securities, CMBS = Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities, ABS = Asset-Backed Securities, IG = Investment Grade
Sources: Credit Suisse, Bloomberg, and BBH Analysis

Percentage of ICE BofAML U.S. Corporate Index In BBH "Buy" Valuation vs. Option-Adjusted Spread



Data reported quarterly from October 31, 2019 to June 30, 2019
Sources: ICE BofAML and BBH Analysis

[2] A unit that is equal to 1/100th of 1% and is used to denote the change in a financial instrument.

[3] Our valuation framework is a purely quantitative screen for bonds that may offer excess return potential, primarily from mean-reversion in spreads. When the potential excess return is above a specific hurdle rate, we label them "Buys" (others are "Holds" or "Sells"). These ratings are category names, not recommendations, as the valuation framework includes no credit research, a vital second step.

end of March. The opportunities picked up in the dislocation around year-end (such **Bunge, Terraform,** and **BNP Paribas**) have been the strongest contributors to our year-to-date performance.

While ABS underperformed corporate credit, they handily outperformed the MBS sector, which underperformed Treasuries in the quarter. We have a near-zero allocation to MBS in the Fund, preferring to direct those dollars to short, higher-quality ABS and corporates wherever possible. This positioning has benefited the Fund.

In general, our credit exposure remains finance-heavy, as we have found attractive spreads in short-dated bank paper and see many large banks as having relatively low credit risk today. ABS are generally financial in nature, although they are diversified over collateral from many different industries, ranging from shipping containers to tax liens to drug royalties. We own very few traditionally cyclical credits (such as oil exploration and automobiles), which have performed very well in this market. The non-cyclical bent of our Fund holdings has hurt corporate security selection.

After being relatively subdued over the past couple of years, biopharmaceutical mergers and acquisitions (M&A) roared back to life in 2019.For example, in late June an obligor in the Fund, **AbbVie** A-, announced the acquisition of **Allergan** BBB for $63 billion in cash and stock to create the world's fourth largest biopharmaceutical with leading franchises in immunology, hematology, and medical aesthetics. Secondary franchises include virology, neuroscience, and women's health. An attractive pipeline with 50-75 compounds and 20 new drug approvals are expected by 2020. The transaction de-risks AbbVie's current product portfolio by significantly reducing its overwhelming reliance on blockbuster drug Humira ahead of an expected loss of U.S exclusivity in 2023. Pro forma annual free cash flow generation of $20 billion should allow for rapid debt repayment to lower leverage to 3.0x in the near term.

We continue to find value across most subsectors of the non-traditional ABS market, as well as selectively in primary and secondary purchases in commercial mortgage-backed securities (in particular property types, such as retail, with limited investor focus or exaggerated concerns).

Melody Wireless Infrastructure Inc. issued its first ABS transaction, backed by cashflows from long-term rooftop lease and cell tower land rents paid by the five major wireless companies. The portfolio consists of 1,232 cellular sites in strategic locations across the U.S. The easements and leases have a utility-like stable return profile, benefit from the deployment of new 5G service, and the notes represent a low leverage of below 30% debt to market value. In April we participated in the 5-year senior tranche, rated single-A, at a spread over Treasuries of 150 basis points.

In May, BBH also participated in **HPLY 2019-HIT,** a single-asset, single-borrower (SASB) CMBS transaction secured by a floating rate loan. Fully extended, the $870 million loan has a five-year term and is collateralized by 92 hotel properties spread across 30 states. The portfolio is diversified across 10 different flags. The largest brand, Hampton, accounts for 29 of the properties and 25% of the portfolio. The sponsor, Hospitality Investors Trust (HIT), is a public non-traded real estate investment trust (REIT) that invests in premium-branded lodging properties across the United States. The senior tranche has very low leverage, with the debt accounting for only 25% of the appraised property value. The AAA-rated tranche was priced at 110 basis points over 1-month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR).

BX 2019-RP is also an SASB CMBS transaction, secured by a $230 million five-year floating rate loan. Originated in June, the loan is secured by a 12-property, 2.2 million square foot anchored retail portfolio, spread across seven states. The primary sponsor is Blackstone, among the largest global investors in real estate with $140 billion in assets under management (AUM). These notes also have low leverage, with even the BBB-rated notes representing just 41% of the appraised property value. We participated in the AAA-, A-, and BBB-rated tranches at spreads over 1-month LIBOR of 115, 210, and 270 basis points, respectively.

We remain on the lookout for sector-specific opportunities, such as those we've seen in insurance, technology, and healthcare, and further issuance of high-quality ABS.

We are at the point in the cycle when the loudest voices are saying we should keep dancing until the music stops and spread narrowing is driven by overseas investors attempting to flee negative yields and fear of missing out. We would argue that you should pay attention to these diminishing returns to risk, and invest accordingly. We see little reason for a huge wave of defaults or a large, systemic crisis, but plenty of reason to think the largest 'technical' ever could reverse.

Sincerely,

Andrew P. Hofer
Fund Co-Manager

Neil Hohmann, PhD
Fund Co-Manager

Share Class Overview
As of June 30, 2019

	Overall Morningstar Rating ™*	Ticker	CUSIP	Inception Date	Total Net Assets (mil)	NAV	30-Day SEC Yield** (Subsidized)	30-Day SEC Yield** (Unsubsidized)
Class I	★★★★★	BBBIX	05528X851	12/03/2002	$6,018.8	$10.24	2.47%	2.47%
Class N	★★★★★	BBBMX	05528X802	12/22/2000	$340.2	$10.25	2.39%	2.24%

* Star ratings are based on risk-adjusted return. The Overall Morningstar Rating for a fund is derived from a weighted average of the performance figures associated with its 3-; 5- and 10-year Morningstar Rating metrics. There are 151 funds in the Ultrashort Bond category as of 6/30/19.

** SEC yield is a calculation based on a 30-day period and is computed by dividing the net investment income per share earned during the period by the maximum offering price per share on the last day of the reported period.

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Credit Quality
As of June 30, 2019

Cash and Cash Equivalents	11.9%
U.S. Treasuries	0.0%
AAA	33.2%
AA	12.1%
A	22.2%
BBB	16.0%
BB	4.1%
B or Lower	0.2%
Not Rated	0.4%
Total	**100.0%**

Top 10 Credits
As of June 30, 2019

World Financial Network Credit Card Master Trust	2.0%
Mariner Finance Issuance Trust	1.7%
PFS Financing Corp	1.6%
Lendmark Funding Trust	1.6%
Chesapeake Funding LLC	1.5%
National Australia Bank Ltd.	1.4%
OSCAR US Funding Trust	1.4%
Trafigura Securitisation Finance PLC	1.4%
Credit Acceptance Auto Loan Trust	1.3%
NextGear Floorplan Master Owner Trust	1.3%
Total	**15.3%**

Reported as a percentage of total portfolio.

Sector Distribution
As of June 30, 2019

Corporate Securities	25.7%
Asset-Backed Securities	44.4%
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities	5.0%
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities	1.3%
Municipal Securities	0.5%
Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities	0.2%
Trust Preferred	0.0%
Loans	10.8%
Cash and Cash Equivalents	11.9%
Total	**100.0%**

Fund Facts
As of June 30, 2019

Number of Holdings	3.01
Effective Duration (years)	0.96
Weighted Average Life (years)	2.06
YTM	3.19%

Holdings are subject to change. Totals may not sum due to rounding.

Credit Quality letter ratings are provided by Standard and Poor's, Moody's and Fitch and are presented as the higher of the three ratings. When a security is not rated by Standard & Poor's, Moody's or Fitch, the highest credit ratings from DBRS and Kroll may be used. Credit ratings reflect the credit quality of the underlying issues in the portfolio and not of the portfolio itself. Issues with credit ratings of BBB or better are considered to be investment grade, with adequate capacity to meet financial commitments. Issues with credit ratings below BBB are considered speculative in nature and are vulnerable to the possibility of issuer failure or business interruption.

Effective duration is a measure of the portfolio's return sensitivity to changes in interest rates.

Weighted Average Life of securities excludes US Treasury futures positions.

Yield to Maturity is the rate of return the portfolio would achieve if all purchased bonds and derivatives were held to maturity, assuming all coupon and principal payments are received as scheduled and reinvested at the same yield to maturity. This figure is subject to change and is not meant to represent the yield earned by any particular security

This material is not authorized for distribution unless accompanied or preceded by a current Fund prospectus.

Opinions, forecasts, and discussions about investment strategies represent the author's views as of the date of this commentary and are subject to change without notice. References to specific securities, asset classes, and financial markets are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as recommendations.

Purchase and sale information provided should not be considered as a recommendation to purchase or sell a particular security and that there is no assurance, as of the date of publication, that the securities purchased remain in a fund's portfolio or that securities sold have not been repurchased.

RISKS

The value of some bonds including asset-backed and mortgage-backed securities may be sensitive to changes in prevailing interest rates that can cause a decline in their prices. Mortgage related securities are subject to prepayment and extension risk. The Fund also invests in derivative instruments, investments whose values depend on the performance of the underlying security, assets, interest rate, index or currency and entail potentially higher volatility and risk of loss compared to traditional stock or bond investments.

Non-investment grade bonds are subject to high level of credit and market risks. The Fund is 'non-diversified' and may assume large positions in a small number of issuers which can increase the potential for greater price fluctuation.

For more complete information, visit www.bbhfunds.com for a current Fund prospectus. You should consider the fund's investment objectives, risks, charges and expenses carefully before you invest. Information about these and other important subjects is in the fund's prospectus, which you should read carefully before investing.

Shares of the Fund are distributed by ALPS Distributors, Inc. and is located at 1290 Broadway, Suite 1100, Denver, CO 80203.

Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. ("BBH"), a New York limited partnership, was founded in 1818 and provides investment advice to registered mutual funds through a separately identifiable department (the "SID"). The SID is registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. BBH acts as the Fund Administrator and is located at 140 Broadway, New York, NY 10005.

Neither Morningstar nor its content providers are responsible for any damages or losses arising from any use of this information. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. The Morningstar Rating™ for funds, or "star rating", is calculated for managed products (including mutual funds, variable annuity and variable life subaccounts, exchange-traded funds, closed-end funds, and separate accounts) with at least a three-year history. Exchange-traded funds and open-ended mutual funds are considered a single population for comparative purposes. It is calculated based on a Morningstar Risk-Adjusted Return measure that accounts for variation in a managed product's monthly excess performance, placing more emphasis on downward variations and rewarding consistent performance. The top 10% of products in each product category receive 5 stars, the next 22.5% receive 4 stars, the next 35% receive 3 stars, the next 22.5% receive 2 stars, and the bottom 10% receive 1 star. The Overall Morningstar Rating for a managed product is derived from a weighted average of the performance figures associated with its three-, five-, and 10-year (if applicable) Morningstar Rating metrics. The weights are: 100% three-year rating for 36-59 months of total returns, 60% five-year rating/40% three-year rating for 60-119 months of total returns, and 50% 10-year rating/30% five-year rating/20% three-year rating for 120 or more months of total returns. While the 10-year overall star rating formula seems to give the most weight to the 10-year period, the most recent three-year period actually has the greatest impact because it is included in all three rating periods. The BBH Limited Duration Fund was rated against the following numbers of U.S.-domiciled Ultrashort Bond category funds over the following time periods: 151 funds in the last three years, 128 funds in the last five years, and 57 funds in the last ten years. With respect to these Ultrashort Bond category funds, the overall BBH Limited Duration Fund (Class I & Class N), received a Morningstar Rating of 5 stars and 5 stars respectively. Class I three-, five- and ten-year periods received ratings of 5 stars, 5 stars and 5 stars respectively. Class N three-, five- and ten-year periods received ratings of 5 stars, 5 stars and 4 stars respectively.

Not FDIC Insured **No Bank Guarantee** **May Lose Money**